1. Governments play a role in the allocation of resources. They can facilitate (or hinder) economic activity in certain geographic regions or in certain sectors by the use of subsidies, tax breaks, infrastructural allocation, preferential credit treatment, and permissions or licenses. 2. Governments lack information-just as private agents do-regarding which sectors are worth pushing in the interests of economic efficiency. 3. Agents lobby the government for preferential treatment. Moreover, lobbying sometimes, but certainly not always, entails bribery of corrupt government bureaucrats. It involves industrial confederations, processions, demonstrations, signature campaigns, media manipulation, and a host of other visible means to demonstrate that preferential treatment to some group will ultimately benefit "society" at large. 4. A government-even if it honestly seeks to maximize economic efficiency-may be confounded by the possibility that both high wealth and true economic desirability create loud lobbies.
Of these four premises, it is immediately necessary to defend the premise of "efficiency maximization." We certainly do not believe that every public decision maker is truly honest. Nor do we believe that all honest governments will seek to maximize economic efficiency before all else. We merely use this assumption as a device to understand the signal-jamming created by the interplay of wealth and true profitability. In doing so, we develop a theory of the interaction between economic inequality and imperfect resource allocation.
We argue that in a world of imperfect information, where lobbying or other forms of costly signaling play the role of providing information to policymakers, wealth inequality may distort the signals transmitted by economic agents. The point that lobbying can be conceived as a costly device to transmit information has already been made by David Austen-Smith (1994) and Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks (2000 S. Banks ( , 2002 , among others. We take this idea a step further, by explicitly linking the cost of lobbying to capital market imperfections, and so to wealth. We wish to capture the idea that profitable sectors have more of an incentive to lobby intensively but, at the same time, sectors dominated by wealthy interest groups find it easier to lobby more intensively. Consequently, policymakers on the receiving end of such lobbies-honest though they may be-can make bad resourceallocation decisions.
Indeed, a corrupt government may not make things that much worse. There is an abundant literature arguing that high inequality is negative for growth-and especially so in developing countries-because this facilitates the buying of corrupt politicians and triggers intense rent-seeking. The point we wish to make here is that one can explain (at least partially) the observation that poor countries with high inequality appear to manage resources rather poorly without having to appeal to the deus ex machina of money-pocketing politicians. (We return to these matters in detail in the concluding section of the paper.)
The model we choose to make these points conceives of a government (or social planner) as an entity that publicly provides licenses, quotas, infrastructure or any essential goods to carry out productive activities. We shall call these objects permissions. A set of economic agents (we might think of them as individuals, production groups, or sectoral/regional interests) compete for these permissions. An agent is distinguished by two characteristics, her productivity and her wealth. This is private information: the government can observe neither wealth nor productivity.
A permission granted to an agent permits a level of output equal to the individual productivity factor. The government has a limited number of permissions and wishes to allocate them so as to maximize economic efficiencyaggregate output in this case. Because productivity is private, however, the government does not know who the appropriate agents are. Instead, agents can send (costly) signals conveying implicit information regarding the returns to being awarded a permission. But the intensity of the signal emitted is conditioned both by wealth and by the productivity level. The government is aware of this possibility and reacts to signals accordingly, in an effort to allocate its limited permissions as efficiently as possible. This is the model of signal-jamming we wish to explore.
We begin our paper by fully characterizing the signaling equilibria of this model, under two restrictions on beliefs and actions. The first employs a slight variation on the "intuitive criterion" (In-Koo Cho and David M. Kreps, 1987) . The second demands that the policymaker treat two signals with the same information content (regarding payoffs) in an identical way. Despite the fact that our model allows for a continuum of productivities, wealths, and signals, these two conditions generate a unique equilibrium (Proposition 1).
We then turn to the connections between wealth, the distribution of wealth, and resource allocation. We do this from several complementary perspectives. First, we consider a scenario in which aggregate wealth changes, keeping the distribution of that wealth constant. Then we study changes in the wealth distribution itself, with mean wealth held constant. For each of these categories of wealth change there are different ways in which we might approach the question of resource allocation. We study two in this paper: allocative efficiency pure and simple, and overall efficiency, which is just allocative efficiency net of lobbying costs.
The principal contribution of this paper is to lay down a methodology for studying these changes. The fact that a potentially complicated multidimensional signaling model precipitates a unique, easily computed equilibrium takes us part of the way. But the real groundwork that runs through the paper lies in Observations 2 and 3. We show there that the effects of any sort of wealth change (first-or second-order) on allocative efficiency can be understood by studying whether a particular composite distribution function (built from the primitives of the model) undergoes second-order stochastically comparable changes when the parameters of interest change.
Using this approach, we show that an increase in wealth must always raise allocative efficiency relative to maximum potential output (Proposition 2).
An equalization of the wealth distribution has more complex effects. The effects of such equalization jointly depend on existing wealth inequality, the distribution of individual productivities, and the lobbying cost function. Redistribution relaxes the constraint in the capital market and permits relatively poor but relatively productive people to lobby harder. This is a positive effect from the allocative point of view, but the overall costs of signaling are thereby altered as well, leading to fresh entry or exit of other wealth-productivity types. Indeed, Examples 1 and 2 demonstrate that allocative efficiency may fall as a result.
At the same time, such perverse effects can occur only if the distributional changes are relatively local in nature. Proposition 3 demonstrates that if the wealth equalization is sufficiently far-reaching, allocative efficiency must rise. Propositions 4 and 5 extend these findings to distributional improvements that do not necessarily take us all the way to perfect equality. Because of the situations in Examples 1 and 2, one cannot hope for unambiguous results. Nevertheless, Proposition 4 establishes that any improvement in inequality that leads to better percentage wealth gains for the relatively poorer and induces net participation in the lobbying market must improve allocative efficiency. In a similar vein, Proposition 5 demonstrates that if one distribution function of wealth dominates another in a sense that we refer to as "strong single-crossing," then, too, allocative efficiency must improve. Now, allocative efficiency alone neglects the costs of lobbying. Accordingly, Section VI takes up the study of overall efficiency: allocative efficiency net of lobbying expenditure. It turns out that one additional condition permits us to replicate every result for allocative efficiency. This is the assumption that the hazard rate of the distribution of productivities is nondecreasing. Observations 4 and 5 show that the methodology laid down in Observations 2 and 3 extends immediately under this additional condition. Propositions 6 to 9 contain the counterparts of the earlier results for allocative efficiency.
Section VII concludes and also contains fairly extensive bibliographical notes. Indeed, if there is a "bottom line" to these arguments, this section attempts to make the case for it: in many matters of public allocation, it is poverty and inequality-and not necessarily corrupt government-which may lie at the root of inefficiency. This casts a different light on the inefficiency of public decision-making in developing countries, one that does not appeal to political appetite for corruption. In this sense, while we focus on an entirely different set of factors, we are in line with the work of Abhijit V. Banerjee (1997) on "misgovernance."
I. The Licence Raj
While a development economist will immediately appreciate that government control over productive licenses and permissions often represents the rule rather than the exception, a few brief remarks may be useful for a broader audience. Governments in developing countries have long sought to control, or encourage (in a particular direction), the allocation of resources. These range from the direct granting of licences or permissions to produce (which fit exactly the model of this paper), to credit or trade subsidies, and to waivers and exemptions from taxes on particular areas of economic activity. The general ideas of this paper apply to all such situations.
A classic example of government regulation has to do with the protection of certain "infant industries" and the subsidy (through tax breaks or preferential credit) of export-oriented industries. But which sectors are to be protected, and which sectors abandoned to existing foreign suppliers? Which export sectors are to be nourished, as providing an important source of future comparative advantage? Through most of the developing world (and indeed, in much of the developed world), these questions are a subject of constant debate.
The title of this section comes from India's (in)famous "licence raj," an era dating from post-independence, and substantially-but far from entirely-dismantled in the liberalization drive of the 1990s. Licensing requirements for the startup of businesses were commonplace, as was protection of domestic sectors against imports. Similarly, the nature and scope of public intervention in China (ostensibly to shape the path of its development) are only too well known. As Anthony Ogus and Qing Zhang (2005) point out, there are at least 146 industrial sectors in China in which special approval and registration are required. And, of course, India and China are not alone in the developing world in their attempt to chart an economic course via the regulatory process.
Such practices are also commonplace in the economically developed world. For instance, the United States is a hotbed of licensing activity, presumably influenced by a host of business interests.
1 Indeed, every state in the United States has a "division of occupational licensing" charged with the role of setting the conditionsoften exams and tests-to qualify for a license. In New Jersey, for instance, there are 41 different commissions regulating different professional activities. Of course, apart from professional and business activities, there are also licences for the exploitation of resources that are under state ownership, such as mining sites, underwater resources, and the radio spectrum.
Analogous considerations apply to the control of imports and exports. The European Union and the United States require licences for imports of several agricultural products. Import licensing is also used for the case of industries that the government thinks should be temporarily protected. Steel, some textiles, or shoes are well-known examples.
Sectors Morck et al. (1998) refer to what they term the "Canadian disease": high inequality in inheritance confers strong lobbying power to individuals whose interests are tied to traditional production sectors. Public policies supporting these low productivity sectors slow down growth. More generally, Morck et al. (1998) find empirical evidence supporting the assertion that countries with high inheritance inequality have lower growth rates. The signaling model described in the introduction applies at two levels. First, there is the question of allocation within a particular regulated sector. Second, the set of regulated activities is itself subject to intense debate. For instance, import licensing activities are often the object of lobbying. An efficiency-seeking government has to evaluate whether the cost of imposing import quotas and licenses can be justified by the gains in helping the local industry to regain momentum. The true potential for future competitiveness, however, is not directly known by the government.
In all of these cases, the better-heeled the sectoral interests, the harder it is to "interpret" the lobby. Are lobby dollars (pesos, rupees) being burnt because much is genuinely at stake, or is it because the marginal cost of burning money is low? It is in this sense that wealth inequality coupled with capital market imperfections may corrupt costly signals and hence reduce the efficiency of public resource allocation.
II. Allocating Permissions: A Model
A government must allocate a fixed stock of a publicly provided input to facilitate production among a unit measure of economic agents. The input must be provided as a single indivisible unit to each agent, if it is provided at all. Think of it as a permission to engage in economic activity. The important restriction is that the number of permissions ␣ is limited: ␣ ʦ (0, 1).
Agents are distributed on [0, 1], and they are endowed with two privately observed characteristics, productivity () and wealth (w). The restriction that wealth is privately observable becomes more compelling provided we agree that we are dealing with a set of agents who are all in an economic position to make large in-vestments. While wealth differences across entrepreneurs and workers may be easier to observe publicly, such differences within the class of entrepreneurs will be less visible.
An agent with wealth w who has expended resources r in lobbying is assumed to incur a cost c(w, r) in the process. If she has productivity and is awarded a permission with probability p, her overall expected return is given by
A. Assumptions
We will suppose that wealth and productivity are uncorrelated. Nothing of qualitative substance hinges on this unless wealth and productivity are positively and closely correlated. But even the polar assumption of independence is not indefensible. Wealth is a proxy for past successes, but if an economy is undergoing rapid change (and this is precisely the sort of economy for which this model has greatest relevance anyway), past successes may be a poor predictor for what will work in the present. Formally, we assume: (A.1) Productivity and wealth are independent draws from distributions F and G, respectively. F and G have supports [0, ϱ) and [w គ , ϱ), respectively (with strictly positive densities in the interior). (A.1) is stronger than what we need, but it will save on expositional resources if we don't have to worry about mass points, gaps in the support, etc.
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Our next two assumptions concern the cost function c(w, r):
2) The cost function is smooth, positive, and strictly increasing in lobbying expenditure r when r is positive (r Ͼ 0), and strictly decreasing in wealth (whenever r Ͼ 0), perhaps with some positive asymptote, with lim r 3 0 c(w, r) ϭ 0 and lim r 3 ϱ c(w, r) ϭ ϱ.
3
The assumption that c decreases in w implies that access to capital markets improves with wealth (see Section IIB for a detailed discussion).
The next assumption states that the ability of increased wealth to create a given relative reduction in lobbying expenditure weakens as wealth increases. For any (w, r) with r Ͼ 0, define the elasticity of cost with respect to wealth (or the wealth elasticity in short) as
where we include the negative sign to capture the absolute value. To be sure, this elasticity will depend on both wealth w and the required lobbying expenditure r. We assume:
(A.3) If w and r increase in a way that leaves total cost unaffected, the wealth elasticity declines.
How reasonable is (A.3)? At least for high wealths (relative to c), it is easy enough to defend a declining wealth elasticity: the efficacy of increased wealth in achieving a given percentage reduction in expenditure has to die out. The assumption requires closer examination for lower levels of wealth: after all, wealth might have to cross some minimum threshold to obtain access to the credit market, so that substantial wealth effects kick in only after that threshold. At the same time, as we have stated before, we are studying not global wealth distributions, but those across the entrepreneurial class, among entities in a reasonable position to start major investment projects in the first place. We return to this discussion below in Section IIB, in which we explicitly consider a credit market model.
The reader might wish to refer to a simple family of functional forms that satisfy (A.3). Suppose that the cost function is of the form
where ĉ(r) is some increasing function, Ͼ 0, and a Ͼ 0. Under this specification, higher wealth lowers costs, but ultimately the marginal cost always asymptotes to some fixed limit aĉЈ(r). It is easy to check that (A.3) is satisfied in this case; although, as the discussion to follow reveals, the separable structure assumed in (2) is by no means necessary for our restrictions to apply.
B. An Example: Imperfect Credit Markets
The cost function c(w, r) is a bit abstract, and at one level we are happy to keep it that way. There is even no reason to insist that w is wealth: it may be some surrogate for access to contacts, or even political power. At the same time, it is important to show that fairly standard models of wealth and capital do fit our framework. To this end, we interpret our model using a simple credit market story.
Suppose that r is drawn from the capital market and that lobbying is one of many (productive or unproductive) uses that r can be put to. Assume banks cannot control this outcome and have the following overall view of the situation: r generates a stochastic nonnegative unit return y (so that total output is ry), distributed according to some smooth increasing cdf M.
Suppose that the bank observes borrower wealth w and lends out r under a simple debt contract that asks for a repayment of c ϭ c(w, r) (this is the function we want to solve out for). There is limited liability, though: if ry ϩ w Ն c, c is repaid; otherwise only ry ϩ w can be seized. Consequently, expected repayment is given by
If there is competition among lenders and the best alternative return on r is r for some Ͼ 0, then
M͑y͒ dy ϭ r.
This arbitrage equilibrium equation implicitly characterizes the cost of credit c in terms of wealth w and the amount borrowed r.
If wealth exceeds r (minus the lowest possible return on r) there are no wealth effects, of course, and c simply equals r. For w smaller, simple differentiation shows that the resulting wealth elasticity is given by
where, for notational compactness, we write ϭ (c Ϫ w)/r. To examine (A.3), we consider all changes dw and dr such that c(w, r) is unchanged: c w (w, r)dw ϩ c r (w, r)dr ϭ 0, so that dr/ dw ϭ Ϫc w (w, r)/c r (w, r). Using (3) to solve this, we have
Using this restriction, we differentiate the elasticity (w, r) with respect to w and r. Doing so, and after some computational steps, we conclude that (A.3) holds whenever
is the hazard rate of M, and k ϵ c/w. Condition (5) helps us describe cases in which (A.3) holds (under some restrictions on minimum wealth). For instance:
OBSERVATION 1: If the distribution of unit returns is given by a Pareto distribution with finite mean, then (A.3) holds whenever individual wealth w is no smaller than one-fourth of the total outlay c(w, r).
It is easy enough to prove this observation. For a Pareto distribution with exponent ␦, we know that h() ϭ ␦. Furthermore, the righthand side of (5) is bounded above by k/4 for all k Ն 1. If mean is finite, then ␦ Ն 1. Combining these observations, (5) holds as long as k is no larger than 4 or, equivalently, the ratio of w to total lobbying outlay is no smaller than 1 ⁄4 .
Thus, if there are no individuals who are "poor enough" in the sense of the ratio described above, (A.3) will be satisfied for this credit markets example. Of course, (5) can easily be applied to derive wealth-cost bounds for other distributions, such as the exponential. Our example, therefore, reinforces the intuitive discussion earlier that (A.3) is more likely to be met for relatively high wealths, where "relatively high" does not appear to imply a particularly large ratio of wealth to lobbying expenditure. 4 This example has the virtue of making an explicit connection between a model of imperfect credit markets-with the imperfection ameliorated by borrower wealth-and the more abstract formulation of the paper, to which we now return.
C. Equilibrium
The government cares about efficiency alone: it would like to single out the most productive types and give them permissions to produce. (In a later section, we remark on an extension with multidimensional government objectives.) Ideally, the government would like to award licenses to all who have productivity exceeding (␣), where this threshold is defined by the condition 1 Ϫ F((␣)) ϭ ␣. On the other hand, individuals would like to be identified as productive types and thus qualify for a permission.
To this end, they engage in lobbying in an attempt to persuade the government that they value a permission very highly. Thus, we view lobbying as a potential device to solve the informational problem.
We may think of an equilibrium of this game as consisting of three objects:
1. A map from types into lobbying expenditure r. This map is a best response in that for each type (w, ), the announcement r is optimal given the government's allocation rule (see 3 below). 2. A map from all conceivable expenditures r (not just the equilibrium ones) to posterior beliefs held by the planner regarding the distribution of productivities associated with r. Of course, for values of r in the support of the map in 1, we require that posterior beliefs must be obtainable using Bayes's Rule. We will impose extra off-equilibrium restrictions on beliefs; see below. 3. A map from lobbying expenditures r to the probability p(r) that an announcement at r will receive a permission from the planner. Given the posterior beliefs held by the planner, we require that p must be chosen in order to maximize expected productivity.
Notice how our definition posits a reactive government which cannot commit to a particular line of action during the lobbying process. 5 We take this approach because we believe that the no-commitment case is often a better description of reality when lobbying is involved. Numerous government officials are frequently involved in the allocation decisions, so that the reputational concerns that might underpin a commitment model (with screening) are attenuated.
D. Equilibrium Refinements
The game as described displays several equilibria. There are two reasons for this multiplicity. The first is standard in the signaling literature: there are equilibria that rely on "implausible" beliefs off the equilibrium path. We employ a version of the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion to rule these out. The second source of multiplicity arises from the possibility that the planner may discriminate between signals that are identical from its perspective (i.e., signals that generate the same posterior expected profitability). We will rule this out by assumption. Now we turn to details.
Variation on the Intuitive Criterion.-As in the standard version of the intuitive criterion, we say that a signal is equilibrium-dominated for some type if emitting that signal were to yield that type a lower payoff than its equilibrium payoff, even under the assumption that such a signal would receive the best possible treatment from the planner. This is standard (and among the weakest in this class of refinements), but we will impose a slightly stronger condition.
Consider an equilibrium, and any off-equilibrium lobbying expenditure r. To begin with, the planner rules out all types for whom r is equilibriumdominated. That still possibly leaves a multiplicity of "admissible" wealth-productivity types. Say that the off-equilibrium signal is productivitymonotonic if, whenever (w, ) gains from emitting it, and Ј Ͼ , then (w, Ј) gains just as much (or more) from emitting it (relative to equilibrium payoff). Now we impose the additional restriction. Define "baseline productivity" of the admissible types to be simply the (conditional) average productivity-using population frequencies-after eliminating those types that are equilibriumdominated. We require that whenever an offequilibrium signal is productivity-monotonic, the planner must entertain no lower an expectation of average profitability among the admissible types than the baseline productivity over those types. For all other signals, no restrictions are imposed.
This condition is mild. It states simply that if higher-productivity types benefit more from emitting an off-equilibrium signal, the planner's beliefs should not downplay such types relative to their population average. The condition is satisfied, of course, if planner beliefs simply equal the population distribution (after removing the dominated types), but handles several other cases as well. 6 The collective restrictions in this section will be dubbed IC.
Belief-Action Parity.-We will assume the following: if the planner believes that the posterior expected profitability is identical across two announcements, then she will allocate permissions with equal probability to individuals making the two announcements. Belief-action parity-hereby christened BAP-does constitute an additional restriction. In the rest of our analysis, we impose the BAP, as well as the IC.
III. Equilibrium
In this section, we state and prove the following result: 
It will be worth running through the proof of this proposition in the main text, because it is very intuitive. As a first step, note that BAP alone takes us quite far in narrowing the set of equilibria: STEP 1. Given BAP, no more than two equilibrium announcements can be serviced with strictly positive probability.
Suppose this assertion is false. Then there must exist three (and perhaps more) equilibrium announcements, r 1 , r 2 , and r 3 , with strictly positive allocation probabilities associated with them. Moreover, the probabilities must be distinct. (If the probabilities were not distinct, no one would make the costlier announcement.) But then, by BAP, the government has distinct posterior profitabilities associated with each of the announcements. So the only way in which the least profitable announcement can be serviced with positive probability is if the other two announcements are being fully serviced, which contradicts distinctness.
As an aside, this observation is extremely general, and its implications for the limited number of equilibrium announcements may be worth pursuing in separate research. In the context of the current model, however, we can obtain more specific restrictions, which rely on the particular structure here and on a repeated application of IC. STEP 2. Under the additional imposition of IC, no more than one equilibrium announcement receives a permission with positive probability.
Suppose not. Then exactly two equilibrium announcements r 1 and r 2 , with r 1 Ͻ r 2 , receive permissions with strictly positive probability. Once again, these probabilities must be distinct (otherwise no one would announce r 2 ), but by BAP this implies that p(r 1 ) ϵ p ʦ (0, 1), and p(r 2 ) ϭ 1. Notice that types in the set T ϵ ͕͑w, ͉͒0 Ͻ Ϫ c͑w, r 2 ͒ Ͼ p Ϫ c͑w, r 1 ͖͒ must announce r 2 and get a permission for sure. (We don't have to worry about weak versus strict inequalities, as these are of measure zero by (A.2).) Now pick any r ʦ (r 1 , r 2 ). This is an off-equilibrium announcement. Notice that r is equilibrium-dominated for any type with Ϫ c(w, r) Ͻ 0 or with Ϫ c(w, r) Ͻ p Ϫ c(w, r 1 ). So the set of admissible types for the announcement is
(again neglecting weak inequalities). An inspection of this set immediately reveals that the announcement r is productivity-monotonic. By IC, our planner's estimate of expected profitability must be no lower than the "baseline expected profitability" calculated by using (conditional) population frequencies over T.
At the same time, notice that when r is close to r 2 , the set T is close to T, so that the baseline expectation of types in T must be close to that in T. But (by BAP), the latter has a higher expected profitability than those types announcing r 1 . Combining the information in this and the previous paragraph, we may conclude that the planner must reward such an announcement with a permission for sure.
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But now observe that all types (w, ) in T-and there is a positive measure of such types-will want to deviate from their equilibrium announcement of r 1 . This means we don't have an equilibrium to start with.
So we are down to a case in which there are at most two equilibrium announcements: 0 and r Ն 0. In the last step, we claim that:
Suppose, on the contrary, that p(r) ϵ p Ͻ 1. Clearly, types in the set T ϵ ͕͑w, ͉͒p Ϫ c͑w, r͒ Ͼ 0͖ will announce r. Now pick some rЈ Ͼ r. Notice that all types not in the set
are equilibrium-dominated. So by IC, the planner must believe that the announcement rЈ comes from T. Now, T is not directly comparable to T, but a little reflection shows that for rЈ large, (7) E͉͑͑w, ͒ ʦ T͒ Ͼ E͉͑͑w, ͒ ʦ T͒ 7 Notice that she has permissions left over after servicing r 2 , which is why p(r 1 ) is positive to begin with.
where these expectations are computed using population distributions. Now observe that rЈ is productivity-monotonic. Consequently, the planner's expectation of productivity in T must be no lower than the statistical baseline. Combining this observation with (7), we must conclude that an announcement of rЈ must be rewarded with a permission for sure. But then all types such that Ϫ c͑w, rЈ͒ Ͼ p Ϫ c͑w, r͒ Ͼ 0 -and there is a positive measure of them-will have an incentive to deviate from their equilibrium announcement of r.
These three steps show that there is a unique equilibrium: it features two announcements with a positive announcement of r earning a permission for sure, and a zero announcement receiving no permissions. The rest of the argument simply balances supply and demand. The volume of available permissions is ␣, and only types with Ͼ c(w, r) will announce r, so that (by Step 3) r must solve the equation
which is (6).
IV. Wealth and Lobbying: General Approach
Our goal is to examine the relationship between different aspects of the wealth distribution and the efficiency of resource allocation. In particular, we study two sorts of changes: one in which all wealth is scaled up by some fixed proportion, and another in which wealth is redistributed from relatively rich to relatively poor, creating a Lorenz-improvement.
There are, of course, other exercises that could be carried out, such as a rescaling of productivity or simultaneous productivitywealth changes. In the interests of brevity, we concentrate on wealth alone, although we shall remark on some of these extensions below.
For each type of wealth change there are two different ways in which we might approach the question of resource allocation. One might consider "ex post" efficiency, which is simply allocative accuracy after lobbying costs are already sunk. A measure of allocative inefficiency would be the difference between maximum potential output-that achievable under perfect information-and equilibrium output. While of interest, however, allocative efficiency cannot tell the whole story, for the transmission of information through signaling is also costly to individuals. Therefore, someone interested in overall efficiency losses must add lobbying costs to allocative shortfalls and study the impact on this variable.
To summarize, then, there are several combinations of potential cause-effect scenarios. Fortunately, as we shall see below, some methodological unification of the various cases can be accomplished.
V. Allocative Efficiency

A. Methodology
We begin the analysis with a study of allocative efficiency, which we simply equate with equilibrium output, given by
(We should really take the ratio of equilibrium output to maximal output, but as long as there are no alterations in productivity, maximal output will not change.) 8 We describe a method for identifying the effect of distributional and scale changes. As we shall see later, this method can be applied (with some qualifications) to the study of overall efficiency as well.
The two situations we wish to compare involve different wealth distributions G and G . Let r and r be the equilibrium lobbies before and after the change. Define two variables These have easy interpretations as the measure of individuals who receive permissions (before and after the parametric change) at each level of wealth. We may also think of z and z as random variables with supports on subintervals of [0, 1] . Within the support, the cdf H of z is given by
where c Ϫw (, r) stands for the inverse function of c(w, r) with respect to w. 9 Similarly, the cdf H of z is given by
for all z within its support. Now the equilibrium conditions (see (6)) determining r and r easily reduce to
(where we use the same integrating index z instead of z and z), which simply states that these two random variables have the same mean.
Moreover, a simple change-of-variables reveals directly that
And exactly the same calculation for output after the change shows that
Combining (12) with (13), we may conclude that
The following observation is fundamental:
The proof of the observation is immediate from differentiating (z) twice with respect to z. Its power lies in the fact that it allows us to generate a useful sufficient condition for a parametric change to result in a gain in allocative efficiency.
OBSERVATION 3: The change from G to G results in an increase in allocative efficiency y if the random variable z second-order stochastically dominates the random variable z.
This methodology is potentially useful in studying all kinds of change in aggregate wealth or its dispersion across the population. As already discussed, we will study two special cases: scalings in wealth and Lorenz improvements in the wealth distribution.
Before embarking on these specific exercises, it may be worth noting that our methodology can also incorporate changes in productivity. To be sure, maximal output will change as well, and so allocative efficiency must be judged by the ratio of equilibrium output to maximal output. See our supplementary notes-Esteban and Ray (2006)-for more details.
B. Across-the-Board Increases in Wealth
To apply the ideas of the previous section, consult Figure 1 . The thick solid line in the diagram depicts the random variable z as a deterministic function of w (following (9)). The dotted line describes what z will become at each old wealth level when wealth is increased across the board, say proportionately. The old wealth level w now acquires the larger value wЈ, and so-if equilibrium r remains at the old levelsimply inherits the value z(wЈ). Because z is increasing in w, this means that the dotted line lies above the original. In other words, more individuals see fit to bid for permissions at every old level of wealth, at the going lobby rate. This cannot be an equilibrium state of affairs, of course, and the required lobby expenditure r must increase. This has the effect of sliding the dotted line downward at every wealth level (see the thin solid line) until "demand equals supply" for permissions. This thin solid line is precisely the new random variable z, except that we express it diagrammatically as a deterministic function of the old wealth levels. Observation 3 asserts that if z stochastically dominates z, then allocative efficiency will have increased post-change. A sufficient condition for such domination-readily visualized in Figure 1-is that the new z-line intersect the old z-line "from above." (Of course, we are discussing sufficient conditions, and weaker restrictions will suffice, but this one is easy to grasp.) In turn, the required swivelling of the z-function may be achieved by several means, but one important requirement is that wealth effects should diminish after some point. This is where (A.3) plays its part; a more formal account follows. (␦w, r) c(w, r) for some w, allocative efficiency must strictly increase.
PROOF:
The following intermediate step will be needed: Returning to the proof of the proposition, we will now show that H is (weakly) less risky than H in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance. Observation 3 then guarantees the first part of the proposition.
To this end, use the definitions of z and z from (9) and (10) to express both variables as functions z 1 and z 2 of the original wealth w (before the scaling). That is, z 1 (w) ϭ z(w) ϭ 1 Ϫ F(c(w, r)) (just as in (9)), while z 2 (w) ϭ z(␦w) ϭ 1 Ϫ F(c(␦w, r) ).
It is easy to see that in the new equilibrium, r Ͼ r. Applying Lemma 1, if for some wealth w we have c(␦w, r) Ն c(w, r), then the same inequality is true of all wЈ Ͼ w. This proves that there exists w* such that (15) z 1 ͑w͒ Յ z 2 ͑w͒ for w Յ w* This implies that the random variable z (weakly) second-order stochastically dominates z, and completes the first part of the proof.
To establish the remainder of the proposition, simply note that if c(␦w, r) c(w, r) for some w, then strict inequality must hold somewhere in (15). The strict concavity result established in Observation 2 then assures us that allocative efficiency must strictly increase.
To see the role of (A.3) from an intuitive viewpoint, consider a scaling of the wealth distribution, with new equilibrium lobby r. Which wealth levels might benefit (or lose) from this change? An agent (w, ) now has endowments (␦w, ), and so is in a "worse" position than she was before if (16) c͑␦w, r͒ Ն c͑w, r͒.
Otherwise, she is relatively "better off." Now observe that all agents cannot be better off (nor can they all be worse off). For then the overall measure of active bidders would change in equilibrium, a contradiction. So-unless there is no net change at allsome agents must be worse off and some better off.
10 For the worse off, (16) applies. But (A.3)-via Lemma 1-tells us that (16) must then continue to apply for all higher wealths. This proves that the net gainers have relatively low wealth, while the net losers have relatively high wealth.
So at relatively low wealths, there is entry, while at relatively high wealths, there are dropouts. But the marginal entrants at low wealth must have higher productivity than the marginal dropouts at high wealth. This increases allocative efficiency under the new equilibrium.
It is clear that the restriction (A.3) is important-though, of course, not logically necessary-in obtaining this result. We have already discussed this restriction in detail and there is little new to be added here. We remark only that it is implausible that (A.3) would fail over an entire range of wealths, and that if it fails at all it is likely to do so for low levels of wealth relative to lobbying cost (e.g., ratios of 0.25 or less in the credit market example of Section IIB).
C. Changes in the Inequality of Wealth
The relationship between inequality and allocative efficiency (and likewise, overall efficiency as we'll see later) is a complex one. Simple intuition would suggest that, as inequality is reduced, highly productive individuals who previously were wealth constrained could now send a signal that awards them a permission, while less productive rich individuals would cease lobbying after having lost wealth. This intuition isn't wrong, but there is much more going on, because the equilibrium lobby itself changes, with subsequent effects on allocative efficiency.
D. Perfect Equality
But first things first: from the characterization of Observation 3, it is clear that perfect equality of wealth (or more precisely, given our fullsupport assumptions, "near-perfect" equality of wealth) is conducive to perfect allocative efficiency. We record this formally as: This proposition has two aspects: one relatively conceptual, the other relatively technical. The conceptual part is that full equality maximizes efficiency; the technical part is that a continuity argument can be made to extend this to "near-equal" distributions, which fit the for-mal model. The technicalities are of little interest and are omitted (see our supplementary notes in Esteban and Ray, 2006, for details) , but the salubrious effects of full equality merit some discussion. In Esteban and Ray (2000) , we study a signaling model restricted to full equality of wealth: it turns out that perfect equality is not always conducive to efficiency, especially when overall levels of wealth are low. The reason is that wealth constraints may shut down revelatory signaling altogether, especially when wealth imposes an absolute upper limit to the amount of r that can be expended. This would happen in a model of "pure" credit rationing where the costs of lobbying become infinite at finite values of r.
11 The assumptions of this paper rule this out: the cost of an incremental lobby may be large, but it is never infinite, and there is always some room to maneuver. 12 One implication of such a cost function is that perfect equality guarantees allocative efficiency. The point, however, is that the link between full equality and full allocative efficiency present in this model is not a mere triviality.
E. Complications
Matters are more complex when there are changes in wealth inequality that don't lead to full equalization of wealths. Indeed, one can construct examples in which an increase in equality lowers allocative efficiency. The details of such a construction are tedious and complicated. But here are the main ideas. In both the examples to follow, we begin with an equalizing Dalton transfer of wealth. EXAMPLE 1: (The equilibrium lobby r falls, and so does allocative efficiency.) Suppose that we array individuals in order of increased wealth. Pick two nonoverlapping intervals of individuals, both at the lower end of the wealth scale, and consider a small Dalton transfer of wealth from the relatively rich interval to the relatively poor interval. This transfer will cause some dropouts in the richer region: individuals with productivities around c(w ϩ , r), where w ϩ belongs to the richer interval, will drop out. But it will also create new entrants in the poorer region: individuals with productivities around c(w Ϫ , r), where w Ϫ belongs to the poorer interval, will enter. Because w Ϫ Ͻ w ϩ and c is decreasing in wealth, the types who enter are more productive than the types who drop out. However, if the density function for productivities falls steeply, a relatively small number of individuals will enter (compared to the dropouts), so to restore equilibrium, the equilibrium lobby r must fall.
The problem is that the fall in r encourages entry across the board of marginal types at every wealth level. So there has been an initial gain in productivity, it is true, but because of the numbers gap the resulting fall in r "contaminates" the productivity distribution by encouraging entry at all wealth levels. This contamination is larger the sharper the fall in the density function for productivity, and indeed allocative efficiency can suffer at the end of the process.
Notice that this example is contingent on the initial wealth transfer occurring at the lower end of the wealth distribution, so that the initial dropouts and entrants are both productive relative to the average. It is the resulting entry of average types (on average!) that worsens the outcome.
EXAMPLE 2: (The equilibrium lobby rises, but allocative efficiency still falls.) A feature of Example 1 is that the equilibrium lobby r falls, so that productivity types around the average level drift into the system. Here is a variation in which this feature is reversed. Suppose once again that an equalizing wealth transfer takes place, but in the higher end of the wealth scale. Suppose, furthermore, that in the relevant region, the density function for productivities is increasing. Now very low productivity types will give way to relatively better-but still low-productivity types. What is more, there are now more entrants than dropouts, so r must rise. This increase now has the effect of creating additional dropouts of all marginal types at all wealth levels. These types, on average, will have higher productivities than those among whom the initial transfer took place. Once again, the entire productivity mix is contaminated and can be affected sufficiently so that allocative efficiency is degraded. In this example, allocative waste moves hand in hand with the loss due to lobbying, whereas in the previous example the movement was in opposite directions.
The possibility that small redistributions in wealth can have effects that are different from more far-reaching interventions has not gone unnoticed in the literature. In a different exercise pertaining to societies with widespread undernutrition (but within the general framework of relating inequality to production efficiency), Partha S. Dasgupta and Ray (1987) establish that small equalizations in wealth can have negative consequences for output and employment. In contrast, large changes always have salubrious effects. While the situation we study-as well as the particular chain of effects-is entirely different, the same phenomenon reappears.
F. Some Unambiguous Findings
The examples above provide perhaps too nihilistic a view. There are certain types of change with effects we can unambiguously describe.
Progressive Equalizations That Induce Participation.-Consider some change in wealth distribution. A beneficiary is someone whose wealth is increased thereby. Say that person A benefits at least as much as person B if the proportionate increase in A's wealth is at least as high as that of B. Now define an equalization of wealths to be progressive if, whenever some person is a beneficiary, each individual with no higher wealth benefits at least as much.
For a given equilibrium r, say that a change in wealth distribution induces participation if the overall measure of types (, w) such that Ն c(w, r) increases, i.e., "more people wish to lobby at the going lobby rate." 
PROOF:
We follow the proof of Proposition 2, with some changes. Let (w) denote the new wealth of someone who had wealth w (the assumption of progressivity makes this a well-defined function). Recall the definitions of z and z from (9) and (10). We may use these to express both variables as functions z 1 and z 2 of the original wealth w (before the change). That is, z 1 (w) ϭ z(w) ϭ 1 Ϫ F(c(w, r) ) (just as in (9)), while z 2 (w) ϭ z ((w)) ϭ 1 Ϫ F(c((w), r) ).
Because the change induces participation, the new equilibrium r exceeds r. Consequently, if, for some beneficiary with wealth w, we have c ((w), r) Ն c(w, r) , then the same inequality is true of all wЈ Ͼ w. To see this, note that for every beneficiary with wealth w and for all wЈ Ͼ w, (wЈ)/wЈ Յ (w)/w, and then apply Lemma 1. This proves that there exists w* such that (17) z 1 ͑w͒ Ն z 2 ͑w͒ for w Յ w* and z 1 ͑w͒ Յ z 2 ͑w͒ for w Ն w*.
In addition, strict inequality must hold over some intervals of wealth in (17) , because there must be some nonbeneficiaries and r Ͼ r. These observations immediately imply that the random variable z is distinct from and second-order stochastically dominates z. Observation 3 completes the proof.
To reconcile this proposition with the two counterexamples-and to facilitate further discussion-note that in Example 1 the equilibrium lobby falls, something that cannot happen if the change induces participation. In our opinion, an encouragement of participation is the interesting and intuitive first-order effect of an improvement in equality: higher-wealth individuals are not too affected by their loss in wealth and so keep lobbying, while the equalizing wealth transfers enable the entry of individuals among the relatively less wealthy. It is possible to unpackage this condition further by providing assumptions on primitives which imply that participation is encouraged. The reader may consult our supplementary notes (Esteban and Ray, 2006) for more detail.
Finally, in Example 2, it is true that the improvement in equality induces participation, but the equalization isn't progressive in the sense we have defined it. In particular, the improvement in distribution takes place only at the upper end of the wealth scale. In contrast to our more cursory dismissal of Example 1, we continue to find these cases interesting, but Proposition 4 does not address them.
Equalizations with Strong Single-Crossing.-In this section, we consider an alternative restriction on the nature of distributional equalizations. The assumption we employ is a joint restriction on the distribution of wealth and the cost function. Consider an initial distribution of wealth, G, and a new distribution of wealth G which are related in the following way.
STRONG SINGLE-CROSSING (SSC). For every strictly positive (w, r) and (w , r) such that c(w, r) ϭ c(w , r) and
As an initial approach to understanding SSC, suppose that (w, r) ϭ (w , r). Then SSC reduces to the condition that for every strictly positive w, G Ј͑w͒ Ͼ GЈ͑w͒ whenever G ͑w͒ ϭ G͑w͒, which says that G indeed stochastically dominates G (in a strong "single-crossing" sense). But SSC clearly implies more, for it involves conditions on the cost function as well. We comment further on this below, but first let us record what SSC does for us. 
See Appendix.
Examples 1 and 2 show how the "direct" effects of an equalization may get swamped by subsequent changes in r. SSC simply does the job of guaranteeing that the indirect effects do not get in the way of the initial impact, which is always efficiency-enhancing.
SSC is a strong condition and we do not intend to push it unreservedly. At the same time, results such as this (and the preceding propositions) show that our methodology permits us to pick carefully through potential minefields, as exemplified in the counterexamples, to nevertheless reach unambiguous results in different classes of cases. As for SSC itself, we refer the reader to our supplementary notes, where we discuss SSC further. In particular, we show that SSC is automatically satisfied whenever a distributional equalization occurs, provided that the cost function displays constant elasticity in wealth and the distribution of wealth is Pareto.
VI. Overall Efficiency
A. Methodology
Allocative efficiency, while of independent interest, does not give us the full picture. A full assessment will need to take into account the fact that signaling comes at a cost. To judge overall efficiency, we need to net out this cost from any measure of allocative efficiency. Fortunately, the same methodology developed in the previous section can be applied here.
Overall efficiency is total output minus equilibrium lobbying costs, and this is given by (19) 
We turn now to a similar computation for the gain in overall efficiency (net of changes in lobbying costs). Use (19) and employ exactly the same change of variables as in Section V A (see (9) and (10)) to see that (20) 
Similarly, overall efficiency Ẽ after the change is given by
and combining this with (20) shows us, in a manner entirely analogous to (14) , that
One might proceed exactly as before if , like its sister function in Section V, were to be concave. However, the analogue of Observation 2 for is not automatically available. It turns out that the curvature of is intimately connected to the hazard rate exhibited by the distribution of productivities F.
Recall that the hazard rate of F at is defined to be
OBSERVATION 4: If the hazard rate is nonincreasing, then (z) is concave (and it is strictly concave if the hazard rate is a strictly decreasing function).
Once again, the proof follows from simple differentiation, but now it is important to focus on the assumption of a nonincreasing hazard rate. For several distribution functions, this assumption is automatically satisfied, but apart from this statistical observation there may be more that can be said in favor of this assumption. Broadly speaking, the assumption of a decreasing hazard rate means that the distribution of productivity draws has a "thick tail." If such draws are viewed as the result of R&D efforts, then recent literature on the subject views the Pareto distribution of productivities as a good working approximation (see, e.g., Benjamin Bental and Dan Peled, 1996; Jonathan Eaton and Samuel S. Kortum, 1999; Kortum, 1997) . The Pareto distribution does satisfy the decreasing hazard rate property.
An analogue to Observation 3 may now be established. 
B. Wealth, Distribution, and Overall Efficiency
The striking parallel between Observations 2(4) and 3(5) guarantees that if the hazard rate of F is nonincreasing, the same results as in Section V can be obtained and, indeed, that the proofs follow identical lines. Without further ado, then, we simply record these results and comment on them very briefly.
In the case in which wealth is scaled up proportionately across the board, overall efficiency must increase, provided that F satisfies the increasing hazard rate condition. It should be noted that while allocations are first best when the wealth distribution exhibits full equality, the same is not true of overall efficiency, which never attains the first-best level in any equilibrium. Nevertheless, under the decreasing hazard rate assumption, perfect equality of wealth does the best of a bad job.
The remaining positive results on inequality also survive unscathed: 
VII. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study the effects of wealth and inequality on public resource allocation, when agents are privately informed of both their productivity and wealth. Agents require public support (in the form of "licenses," "permissions," or public infrastructure) in order to translate their potential productivity into hard economic reality. To this end, they lobby the government for support. Agents with higher productivity lobby harder, but so do agents with higher wealth. The multidimensional nature of privately observed characteristics creates a signal-jamming problem.
In our model, the government seeks to maximize efficiency through its allocation of public support. Do we believe that governments really act in this way? Posed literally, the answer to this question is obviously in the negative, but this is not the interesting question. The issue is whether corruption in the public sector necessarily lies at the heart of public misallocation of resources. The model we study throws light on this question, and argues that there may be features deeper than corruption at work.
Our main results can be summarized as follows:
1. The outcome of inefficient public decisionmaking is perfectly compatible with the assumption of an honest, efficiency-seeking planner. Therefore, the observation of poor performance by government agencies cannot be taken as an unambiguous indicator of more sinister motives on the part of those agencies. 2. The extent of inefficiency in public decisions-for a given degree of inequalitydepends on the aggregate level of wealth. Poor countries will tend to display higher degrees of inefficiency, both allocative and net of the lobbying cost. 13 Once again, it is tempting (though possibly erroneous) to conclude that corruption is more widespread in poorer economies. 13 It should be noted that these results do depend on assumptions that may be violated in very poor economies, leading to a nonmonotonic relationship between wealth and public efficiency. See also Pranab K. Bardhan (1997) , who presents a complementary argument for such nonmonotonicity, based on the possibility that in the early stages of growth, emerging opportunities are large relative to a rudimentary public administration.
3. The degree of efficiency in the public allocation of resources also depends on existing inequality in the distribution of wealth. Here, the relationship is more complex. Nevertheless, in several interesting cases, a reduction in inequality improves public efficiency in decision-making. In particular, this observation is true of reductions in inequality that are sufficiently far-reaching. Thus, unequal economies may appear as more "corrupt."
Our contributions are relevant to at least four strands of the literature. In the first place, since the mid 1990s, the analysis of the interaction between inequality and growth has attracted significant attention. Broadly speaking, there have been two major explanations for the negative role of inequality on growth. The first one is based on the argument that with imperfect capital markets, wealth-constrained individuals will be forced to make choices that do not duly develop their abilities, so that aggregate output is below its potential level. It follows that the extent of the efficiency loss critically depends on the number of individuals for whom this constraint is binding.
14 The second major type of explanation has a political-economy flavor and has been expressed in a number of ways. One line argues that high inequality will induce voters to support higher degrees of redistribution, thereby inducing heavier distortions on intertemporal resource allocation, specifically dampening investment. 15 A second line of research studies the relationship between social conflict and growth. 16 These two main approaches-the one based on missing markets, the other on political or social struggle-have been developed quite independently from each other. There is much to be gained in marrying the two. Models of imperfect capital markets, while insightful in themselves, would be enriched by taking on board the political process. The implication for the second strand of literature-at least, the part that focuses on democratic redistribution-is more damaging. As Perotti (1993 Perotti ( , 1996 , Bén-abou (1996) , and others have noted, initial inequalities may be related to slower growth, but evidently not through the channels proposed in this part of the theoretical literature. Unequal societies tend to under-rather than overredistribute. Thus unequal societies may have inimical effects on growth because they stay unequal (and therefore suffer from one or more of the woes in the missing-markets story), and not because of some incentive-sapping drive toward equality.
A second strand of the literature to which our paper may contribute is in providing an explanation for the observed association between political power and wealth. This point goes back as far as Plato: even in a democratic society, effective political power is positively correlated with wealth. Francisco Rodríguez (1997) and Bénabou (2000) address this issue explicitly. Specifically, Bénabou posits that the political weight of a voter depends on her rank in the wealth distribution, and then examines the implications of such a postulate. Our paper obtains this positive association between political and economic power as an equilibrium condition of a signalling game: higher wealth obscures true productive merit in the quest for public support of economic projects.
A third area of relevance is the study of lobbying as a means to transmit information to a planner. We draw on the idea that the process of decision-making by governments is fraught with information gaps. In this sense, our model shares features in common with a literature that views lobbying as a communicator of socially valuable information (see, for example, AustenSmith, 1994; Banks, 2000, 2002; Austen-Smith and John R. Wright, 1992; Morten Bennedsen and Sven Feldman, 2002; Susanne Lohman, 1994; Eric B. Rasmusen, 1993) . Such an approach is especially relevant for societies undergoing rapid transformation. It may be very hard for a planner to understand and foresee the correct direction in which the economy must go. 17 In this sense, lobbying serves as a generator of possibly useful information, in contrast to the black-box models of rent-seeking analyzed in profusion in the literature.
Finally-and mentioned already at several points in this paper-the literature on corruption is certainly relevant to the issues raised here. After all, even in the most conspicuous democracies there is only a limited number of issues which are decided by majority voting. Referenda are exceptional. Thus, there is always ample room for discretionary government decisions, which can be influenced by the citizens. It is the existence of this discretionary space that explains the development of rent-seeking, lobbying, and even corruption. 18 Indeed, almost the entire literature on lobbying or rent-seeking in developing societies explicitly or implicitly assumes that corruption is at the heart of the problem. 19 Agents use resources in order to induce government decisions most favorable to their interests. Whether these resources are fully wasted or used to bribe government officers does not seem to be essential to the story. Indeed, in this literature it is difficult to distinguish between a politician who is honestly impressed (in the informational sense) by the amount of lobbying done by an agent and one who is simply bribed by the agent who pays the most.
The flip side of this story is that the wealthy fuel corrupt behavior in their attempt to corner public resources. Indeed, the idea that wealthy agents may confound the resource allocation process because of their greater ability to corner resources is not new at all. The point has been made in development contexts time and again (see Bhagwati and Desai, 1970; and Bardhan, 1984 , for insightful analyses along these lines). But the point has usually been made in the context of corrupt bureaucracies-scarce permissions or infrastructure may be bought by wealthy agents by simply bribing corrupt officials. In contrast, we attempt to argue that poor decision-making is to be expected even from honest, efficiency-seeking governments. This is a case in which it does not take two to tango.
Is the distinction important? We believe it is. The emphasis on the buying of corrupt politicians (or public decision-makers) in developing countries may lead to overemphasis on the woes perpetrated by bureaucratic dishonesty, and relative neglect of the intrinsic problems of the resource-allocation process. The role of "institutional failures" in explaining the difficulties of some developing economies in taking off, despite massive foreign aid, is a standard theme. The World Development Reports of 1997 Reports of , 2002 , and 2003 make a point of this. For instance, the 2003 report states that "high levels of corruption are associated with poverty, inequality, reduced domestic and foreign direct investment, and weak overall economic performance." The empirical evidence for this type of implied causality is rather weak. After the work of Mauro (1995) identifying a negative relationship between corruption and growth, subsequent research has substantially moderated the relevance of this effect, as in Hongyi Li et al. (2000) and Daniel Treisman (2000) .
In our paper, we have argued that the causality in the opposite direction should not be overlooked. In a world of imperfect capital markets, aggregate poverty and distributional inequality pollute the transmission of information from private interests to policymakers and end up provoking inefficient decisions. In fact, this reverse causality argument is aligned with the empirical findings by Treisman (2000) . He finds that the log of per capita GDP can explain at least 73 percent of the cross-country variation in the indices of perceived corruption and that, when testing for the direction of causality, there are "strong reasons to believe that ... higher economic development does itself reduce corruption."
We do not deny the existence of corrupt practices. Our point is that the evidence of inefficient decision-making cannot be taken as a "smoking gun" for corruption. All the empirical evidence available consists of opinion indices constructed by interviewing firms, investors, or plain citizens (see Treisman, 2000) . The fact is that we cannot exclude the hypothesis that such opinions may reveal rationalizations of seemingly capricious public decisions rather than the direct observation of illegal money payments.
APPENDIX PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5:
Define z ϵ 1 Ϫ F(c(w, r)) and z ϵ 1 Ϫ F(c(w, r)), just as we did before, and consider two cdfs defined over this variable: 
